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Abstract 
 
Using data from a national survey of farm households in the United States, this paper examines 
the effects of farm households’ decisions to participate in the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) and to work off the farm on the technical efficiency of farm household production. After 
controlling for the self selection bias in estimating the multiple output-oriented distance 
functions, results show that operators’ decisions to work off the farm (both separately and 
combined with participation in CRP) lead to higher technical efficiencies for farm household 
production— implying improvements in the resource allocation between farm and other 
productive activities by farm households. The technical efficiencies of household production of 
those farm households participating only in the CRP are lower. 
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Introduction 
 
Due to the diverse nature of farms and the increasing interconnection between the farm business 
and farm household, the context within which agricultural policy is formulated is increasingly 
complex (Offutt 2002). Improvements in the well being of farm households have been due to the 
interaction of technological adoption that released labor from farms and economic growth that 
pulled labor off the farms. The dependence of farm families on income from off-farm work has 
increased steadily in many OEDC countries, narrowing, or reversing, the gap between incomes 
of farm and non-farm households (e.g., Gardner 2000; OECD 2003, p. 7). According to data 
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, these effects in the United States have been 
particularly dramatic; off-farm income as a share of total U.S. farm household income rose from 
about 50 percent in 1960 to more than 80 percent in recent years. (USDA 2007a).   
For developed countries on both sides of the Atlantic, these changes in the composition 
of farm household income occurred largely against the backdrop of a traditional commodity-
oriented farm policy until environmental goals were elevated along side commodity policy 
objectives beginning in the mid-1980 (OECD 2001, p. 47). These environmental objectives were 
promoted through the conservation compliance provision of U.S. farm policy legislation and a 
variety of measures introduced in other OECD countries that focused on inappropriate farm 
management practices incompatible with environmental objectives. The implementation of 
measures to improve the environmental performance of agriculture has often been accompanied 
by payments for changes in land use for adopting low-input or organic farming systems. In the 
United States, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), introduced during that period as well, 
has become the largest Federal program targeting land use, and it now pays farmers about $2 
billion per year to remove 39 million acres from crop production (USDA 2007b).  
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Although CRP payments are small compared with off-farm income, each may constitute 
a significant source of reliable income to farm households not directly related to the agricultural 
production, a characteristic that may gain added significance as farmers are exposed to greater 
market price risk. For this reason, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that these decisions 
are interrelated. Moreover, since both CRP participation and off-farm work remove substantial 
resources from agricultural production, these decisions are likely to have important implications 
for the efficiency of farm production, but for the efficiency of farm household production as well. 
The recent study by Phimister and Roberts (2006) of the effects of off-farm work on the intensity 
of agricultural input use in England and Wales is evidence that there is broad interest in related 
issues, as is a recent study that relates farm efficiency to off-farm work by farm operators by 
Goodwin and Mishra (2004).  
The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of the decisions to 
participate in CRP and to work off the farm by farm operators in the United States on the 
technical efficiency of farm household production. Because CRP participation and off-farm work 
affect the level of resources available for farm production, it is important to quantify the effects 
of these decisions on the technical efficiency of household production, including farm and non-
farm activities. Therefore, to measure technical efficiency, we account explicitly and separately 
for both the resources committed to CRP and off-farm work and the returns from the 
commitment of the resources within the context of the broader farm household production 
activities. Our measures of technical efficiency are derived from estimated stochastic multi-
product, output-oriented distance functions for farm households. Separate functions are estimated 
for each of four groups of farms, those that: participate in both CRP and off-farm work; 
participate only in CRP; participate only in off-farm work; and participate in neither. In addition 
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to the sales of farm outputs and consistent with other studies of farm household efficiency both 
in the United States and elsewhere (e.g. Paul and Nehring 2005; Nehring, et al. 2005; Chavas, et 
al. 2005 and Gonzalez and Lopez 2007), earnings from off-farm work are included as a separate 
output of the farm household for households in the appropriate groups. Because of our specific 
interest in the effect of CRP participation on the efficiency of farm household production, 
payments for land enrolled in CRP are also included as a separate output of the farm household 
for those households in the appropriate groups. To account for input use appropriately, 
household labor committed to off-farm work and land committed to CRP are included in the 
multiple output distance functions for the households. 
Several other features distinguish our analysis from recent studies on household 
efficiency at the farm household level. First, we estimate multiple output distance functions that 
control for the potential self selection bias due to both CRP participation and off-farm work.1 To 
account for this simultaneity, perhaps in part due to some unobserved heterogeneity, we test for 
the selection bias in order to justify statistically our corrections for these two decisions in farm 
household production. In so doing, we must then decompose the random and the technical 
inefficiency components of the composite errors in the distance functions using a method-of-
moments procedure.2 Finally, to examine the extent to which CRP participation and off-farm 
                                                 
1 The rationale of correcting for self selection in estimating these frontier functions is in the same spirit as that of 
Goodwin and Mishra (2004, p. 726). They argue that off-farm labor supply is likely to be endogenous to farming 
efficiency, since efficiency is a factor in determining the implicit wage for on-farm labor. Phimister and Roberts 
(2005, p. 495) also argue that “unless this potential simultaneity [between off-farm work and on agricultural 
production] is taken into account, estimates derived from the econometric models may be biased.” A similar 
argument suggests that farming efficiency would affect the implicit value of land in production and, in turn, affect 
the supply of land for CRP. 
2 As is seen below, the terms incorporated into the distance functions to correct for self selection are derived from a 
bivariate choice model of participation in CRP and off-farm work. Furthermore, the distinct exogenous factors that 
explain participation in off-farm work and CRP also characterize the environment in which farm and household 
production take place. Thus, in the same spirit as that suggested by Coelli et al. (2005, pp. 281-282), our 
specification accounts for the effects of these non-stochastic “environmental” variables on technical efficiency, only 
in our case, the effect is an indirect one operating through the terms that correct for self selection. Unfortunately, 
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work may affect the distributions of the household efficiency, we compare these four 
distributions of technical efficiency among the four mutually exclusive participation groups by 
stochastic dominance criteria, and we test for differences in the distributions using methods by 
Davidson and Duclos (2000). 
By way of a brief summary, our results suggest that farm operators’ decisions to work off 
the farm (both separately and combined with participation in CRP) have increased technical 
efficiency—implying improvements in the resource allocation by farm households. In contract, 
participation in the CRP appears to be accompanied by lower measures of technical efficiency 
for the combined household activities. Furthermore, while the central focus of our analysis is on 
the efficiency of farm household production, the results from the estimated choice model offer 
support for the hypothesis that decisions to participate in the CRP and in off-farm work are 
indeed correlated. Through an examination of these results, we also develop a better 
understanding of how these decisions depend on the human capital and risk attitudes of farm 
operators, as well as land quality, farm size, and participation in other government programs. 
We begin the remainder of the paper by formulating the discrete choice model. We then 
go on to introduce the methods by which technical efficiency for farm household production is 
estimated. We next describe the data, and the discussion of empirical results is followed by some 
concluding comments and a discussion of policy implications.  
Modeling the Choices—A Bivariate Probit Model 
As is commonly seen in the discrete choice literature, each of these two decisions is 
determined by a comparison between benefits from participation with those from non-
participation. The CRP participation decision can be thought of as being determined by a 
                                                                                                                                                             
because of the need to decompose the error structure in the distance functions, these separate indirect effects cannot 
be isolated.  
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comparison of the government’s potential payment for land in CRP with the reservation per acre 
return to retain land in production. Similarly, the decision to work off the farm is determined by 
a comparison of the potential off-farm wage with the shadow value of time in farming. The 
participation equations that capture these comparisons can be specified as (Greene 2003): 
(1)      1111 '* eXHI +=
         2222 '* eXHI +=
Ii  = 1  iff   Ii* ≥  0;    and      Ii  = 0  iff   Ii* ≤  0     i =1, 2 
where X1, X2 are the two vectors of distinct exogenous factors that are associated with the 
participation in CRP and the decision to work off the farm, respectively. H1 and H2 are vectors of 
the parameters, and e1, e2 are the random disturbance terms. The latent choice variables (I1*, I2*) 
represent the propensities of each decision. The actual binary decision indicator for each decision 
is observed as 1 (0) only if the latent variable is greater (less) than zero.3 Suppose the joint 
distribution of (e1, e2) follows a bivariate normal distribution, where the correlation coefficient 
( ρ ) captures the joint nature of these two decisions. The consistent estimators can be obtained 
by using the maximum likelihood method on the log likelihood function (Greene 2003): 
(2)  ]})12))(12[(()],')(12[()],')(12{[(loglog 21222111
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i
The bivariate probit model is an extension of the binary choice case that allows for a correlation 
between pairs of binary choices. Therefore, a likelihood ratio test can be conducted to test if 
these two decisions are independent (i.e. 0:0 =ρH ).  
 
 
                                                 
3 Subscript 1 is for the CRP decision and subscript 2 is for off-farm work by the operator. 
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Estimating Technical Efficiencies for the Farm Household  
To estimate technical efficiencies for farm households, we adopt methods similar to those of 
Paul and Nehring (2005). That is, we estimate the multi-output production technology by 
stochastic frontier techniques applied to output distance functions. 4 We estimate separate 
distance functions for the four groups: those that participate in both CRP and off-farm work; 
those that participate only in CRP; those that participate only in off-farm work; and those that 
participate in neither.5 To account for their effects on farm and farm household outputs, we treat 
the decisions to work off the farm and participate in CRP as endogenous.6  
The Multiple Output Distance Functions  
Following the specification similar to that in previous studies (e.g., Shephard 1970; 
Grosskopf et al. 1995; Paul et al. 2000), each multi-output distance function is specified 
as }{ )()/(:min),( xTxyyxD ∈= θ , where x, y are input and output vectors and T (.) represents 
the production technology. The distance function is non-decreasing, positively linearly 
homogeneous and concave in y and decreasing in x.7 To estimate this function, linear 
homogeneity with respect to outputs must be imposed, which can be accomplished by 
normalizing by one of the outputs (e.g. Coelli and Perelman 2000). The multi-output distance 
                                                 
4 From a theoretical point of view, it may, as suggested by one of the reviewers, be appropriate to specify and 
estimate a dual indirect multiple-output, multiple-input household revenue function. However, there are no prices 
included within the ARMS data; it was impossible to consider this strategy in this study. Moreover, Mundlak (1996) 
argues for a primal modeling approach to estimate production technology because econometricians do not know the 
prices (or price expectations) that firms (or households in our case) use to make their production decisions.  
5 For the group that participates in both CRP and off-farm work, there are three outputs for the farm household: farm 
output, off-farm income and CRP payments. For the group that participates only in CRP, there are two outputs for 
the household: farm output and CRP payments. For the group that participates only in off-farm work, there are also 
two outputs for the farm household: farm output, off-farm income; and for the group that participates in neither, 
there is only one output of the farm household: farm output. Since there is only one output for farm households in 
this latter group, the output distance function reduces to a single output production function which can still be 
estimated using stochastic frontier techniques (e.g. Coelli and Perelman 2000).  
6 Although Paul and Nehring (2005) and Nehring et al. (2005) specify off-farm income as an output of the farm 
household, they do not account explicitly for the effects of the decision to work off the farm in estimating technical 
efficiency. 
7 We focus on a multiple output distance function, but our results also apply to a single output farm production 
function, which is merely a special case the multi-output distance function.  
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functions can be rewritten as: ),(),( yxkDkyxD =  for any k > 0. The conventional way is to 
define the factor k as 1/yj, where yj is the output for specific output j, and then obtain 
, where y* are the other output vectors normalized by output yj. 
Assuming a translog functional form approximation yields:
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where i is the specific participant group (i = 1,…,4), m and n are outputs, l and k are inputs.  For 
convenience, we rewrite equation (3) as: 
(4)      )ln(),,*,,()ln( iiiiiiiji DryxTLy −=− βα  
Equation (4) is consistent with the standard stochastic production frontier framework (Aigner et 
al. 1977), since it can be further rewritten as:  
 (5)      iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiji ryxTLuvryxTLy εβαβα +=−+=− ),,*,,(),,*,,()ln(  
where the random variable (vi) is assumed to have a normal distribution, N~(0, σ2vi); the random 
variable (ui) is the technical inefficiency component, and it is assumed to follow a half normal 
distribution, N+~(0, σ2uj ). These two components are assumed to be independent. The random 
variable (εi) is the composite error. 
Correcting for Self-Selection 
Since the decisions to work off the farm or to participate in CRP may be correlated to 
farm output or the level of farm household production due to some unobservable heterogeneity, a 
                                                 
8 The translog functional form is not only flexible, but it allows us to impose the necessary homogeneity constraints. 
This specification is commonly utilized in other studies (e.g. Paul and Nehring 2005; Coelli and Perelman 2000). 
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potential problem of self-selection may exist. Although perhaps desirable, it is not possible 
within this model to deal with the sample selection problem by applying full information 
maximum likelihood methods.9 As an alternative, we utilize a two-stage estimation method 
similar to those in Bradford et al. (2001) and Huang et al. (2002) who deal with a single binary 
choice within a stochastic frontier model. In the first stage, we estimate the multi-output distance 
function based on the composite error term, including as regressors of the correction terms for 
self selection bias estimated from the bivariate probit choice model. In contrast to Bradford et al. 
(2001) and Huang et al. (2002), we derive these correction terms for self selection based on a 
semi-parametric framework proposed by Das et al. (2003) and earlier by Lee (1983).10                                
The need for this semi-parametric framework can be explained in the following way. We 
know that conditional expected production for each group, given the joint distribution between 
the errors and the random error of the bivariate probit model ( iee ε,, 21 ), is: 
 (6)  iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii ryxTLIIEryxTLIIYE 22112121 ),,*,,(),|(),,*,,(),|)(ln( λρλρβαεβα ++=+=−  
where λ1i and λ2i are correction terms for self selection bias corresponding to CRP and off-farm 
work decisions, respectively. However, the application of the standard Heckman type formula 
for ( ii 21 ,λλ ), only valid under the trivariate normal distribution assumption among ( iee ε,, 21 ), is 
not appropriate since it has been shown that the composite error ( iε ) does not follow a normal 
                                                 
9 Conceptually, it is difficult to accommodate the bivariate probit choice mechanism in a one-step MLE procedure to 
estimate the multiple-output distance function. To gain efficiency by dealing with the sample selection problem 
directly, one has to specify the conditional distributions for the components, (vi-ui | I1, I2), and estimate equation (5) 
along with the bivariate choice equation (1) in one step with maximum likelihood methods. However, this is 
challenging because the random variable u is assumed to be a one-sided error, and the joint distribution is 
multivariate. To the best of our knowledge, no one has developed a tractable empirical method to solve this 
particular problem as it relates to estimating stochastic production frontiers.    
10 Lee (1983) proposed a flexible self-selection correction term for any given choice structure. In his case, the 
estimation of the sample selection model with a multinomial logit structure had been developed. Das et al. (2003) 
extend Lee’s (1983) method to the fully nonparametric case. The approach proposed by Lee and Das et al. is semi-
parametric in that it does not require specific knowledge of the joint distribution between the choice and outcome 
equations. 
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distribution.11 Rather, these two terms that correct for selection bias can be calculated as (Das et 
al. 2003, p. 35): 
(7)    
)1(
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where prob(I1i=1) and prob(I1i=1) are the estimated marginal probabilities of CRP participation 
and off-farm work from the bivariate probit model; (.)φ  and  are the density function and 
the inverse cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, respectively. By 
including these terms that correct for self-selection bias, the application of OLS to equation (6) 
by group gives consistent estimators for (
(.)1−Φ
iiii r ,,, i 21 ,ρρβα ).  
Calculating Technical Efficiencies 
To calculate technical efficiency for each participant within each group, the composite 
error term of equation (5) is further decomposed into its random error and technical inefficiency 
components. To do this, we must first recognize that the expected values of the one-sided error 
terms (E (ui)) are not equal zero. Equation (5) can be rewritten as: 
(8)      , )]([)(ˆ)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ*,,()ˆln( iiii
F
iiiiiiiii uEuvuEYryxTLY +−+−=+=− εβα
which implies that:  
(9)       and       )()ˆ,ˆ,ˆ*,,( i
F
iiiiiii uEYryxTL −=βα )()]([ˆ iscfiiiii uEeuEuv +=+−=ε . 
Using the predicted residuals ( iεˆ ) from equation (9), the parameters ( ) can be calculated 
based on the fact that the second and third central moments of (
2
viσ
iεˆ ) should be equal to the second 
and third central moments of (vi-ui) since E(ui) is constant. The parameters ( ) and the 
composite error can then be calculated as (see Huang et al. 2002): 
22 ˆ,ˆ viui σσ
                                                 
11 We thank a thoughtful reviewer for this observation. 
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Once this equation (10) has been estimated, the calculation of the technical efficiency index 
requires point estimates of the random variable ui for each farmer. Following Jondrow et al. 
(1982), the expected value of ui given the composite error (vi-ui) under the assumption of a half-
normal distribution is:  
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The technical efficiency index of each farmer within each group can be calculated as: 
(12)    . }ˆ|ˆ(exp{
ijscfij
euETE −=
                                                 
12 Equation (10) can be derived as follows: under the half-normal distribution, ui is assumed to be . The 
first three moment conditions for ui are: 
),0( 2uiN σ+
iui
uE σπ
2)( = ;     22)(
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uV σπ
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uE σππ −−= . 
To solve for the parameters ( ), recall the definitions of second and third moments:   22 , uivi σσ
        2222
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      Solving these two equations, the consistent estimators of ( ) can be shown as: 22 , uivi σσ
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Once the estimators of ( ) have been determined, the components of the error in the stochastic frontier can 
be obtained as: 
22 , uivi σσ
iuiscf
e σˆˆ = i πε
2ˆ −  . Olson et al. (1980) have shown the consistency of the estimators based on 
the two-stage method of moments. 
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The Data 
The primary farm household data for this study are drawn from the 2001 Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), an enumerative survey conducted each year by the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of USDA. The ARMS database is one of 
USDA’s primary vehicles for collecting and disseminating data on a wide range of issues about 
agricultural resource use and farm financial conditions. For purposes of this study, the ARMS 
data on off-farm income and participation in the variety of traditional farm programs and 
environmentally-related programs (e.g. CRP), are particularly important. Since our primary 
objective is to understand how decisions to participate in CRP and work off the farm affect the 
technical efficiency of farm household production, we limit our attention to farms classified as 
crop farms.13 There are 2,190 observations in the sample.  
To underscore the interrelationships between CRP and the off-farm work by farm 
operators, participation rates in the sample are exhibited in Table 1. About 22% of the farm 
households participate in CRP, and for about 56% of these farm households, the operator also 
works off the farm.14 This means that only 280 (about 12%) of the farm households participate in 
both activities. Furthermore, while 950 farm households (about 44%) participate only in the off-
farm labor market, only 209 (about 10%) participate only in CRP. 
In a study also based on the ARMS data and designed to identify the effect of CRP 
payments on acreage enrolled in CRP, Chang and Boisvert (2009) document the importance of 
                                                 
13 We do so for two important reasons. First, based on the 2001 ARMS data, most CRP participants are crop farms; 
the participation rate is 22%, with an average enrollment of 163 acres. In contrast, livestock farms accounted for 
52% of all farms, but only 2% of livestock farms were in CRP, with an average enrollment of 4 acres. Furthermore, 
given the diversity of crop farming nationwide, it is already a considerable stretch to argue that there is a single 
production function for CRP participants and another for non-participants. The inclusion of livestock farms would 
have only compounded the difficulties in specifying and estimating the multiple output distance functions. 
14 The participation rates for our study are weighted by full sample weights, since we are interested in the farm 
household population. Our results are compatible with those by Ahearn and Lee (1991). According to Census of 
Agriculture, about 30% of farm operators worked some off the farm in 1929; this increased to about 53% by 1982.   
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including in our choice model environmentally related characteristics of the land enrolled in CRP, 
as well as some indication of the level of CRP payment. Although the ARMS database contains 
valuable information on the farm operation and the farm household, it unfortunately lacks 
information on land quality on the farm, local area economic characteristics, and certain aspects 
of the physical terrain or the quality of the area’s land base that likely affect decisions to 
participate in the CRP and to work off the farm. To compensate for this lack of data, we also rely 
on some data from additional sources. For example, by aggregating data from the individual CRP 
sign-up files for 2001, we were able to include county-level indexes for wind and water erosion 
and county averages for the maximum allowable CRP rent payments.15 The economic 
characteristics of local area are also merged into our ARMS data set. These are county-level data 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis income files in 2000, the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
employment files in 2000, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Census of Population, STF-3 
file.  
Three types of the household outputs are recognized. Gross cash sales are used as the 
measure of agricultural output, and the two non-farm outputs are: the wages and salaries from the 
off-farm work and the annual payment of CRP as the income from environmental program 
participation. Four inputs, including hours worked on the farm, operated acres, hired labor cost, 
                                                 
15 Data from the CRP signup files, which have been used elsewhere, including in a study of farmers’ attitudes 
toward CRP bidding by Vukina et al. (2008), were made available to us by Robert Dubman and Shawn Bucholtz of 
the ERS, USDA. However, these data only relate to the enrollments in 2001. Therefore, while it is possible to use 
these data to assign county level indexes for these variables to our observations, it is still impossible to merge the 
information for any farms that might be in both this file and the ARMS data because the farmer identification 
numbers are different. It is also important to emphasize that this is but one issue of concern to those using the 
ARMS data for complex economic analysis. It relates to broader concerns regarding the feasibility of integrating 
ARMS with other surveys and data sources, as well as some potential for bias due to the simultaneous nature of CRP 
enrollment and efficiency and the lack of repeated sampling with the ARMS data. Recommendations to address the 
integration issue and the feasibility of obtaining panel data from ARMS are contained in a recent review of the 
USDA's Agricultural Resource Management Survey by the National Research Council of the National Academy of 
Sciences (NRC 2007). 
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and capital, are specified.16 Hired labor costs include regular hired labor and contract labor. 
Capital use is measured by the fixed value of building and farm equipment, excluding the value 
of principal operator’s dwelling. The hours of off-farm work are added to the hours worked on 
the farm for farmers with off-farm work. The aggregate input for land (LAND) is defined as the 
total operated land area, including land owned, plus land rented in, less land rented out. Because 
this variable is an input included in the multiple output distance functions, it includes any land in 
CRP, because land in CRP is an input that must be accounted for in household production for the 
two groups that participate in CRP.17   
Empirical Results 
The Bivariate Choice Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the bivariate probit 
model.18 The parameter RHO (= 0.15) is the correlation between the error terms in the two 
participation equations. The value of the likelihood ratio test under the null hypothesis that RHO 
                                                 
16 Output is the same as used by Goodwin and Mishara (2004) to study the effect of off-farm work on farm 
production efficiency. The list of inputs is similar (but not identical) to those specified by Nehring et al. (2005), and 
we measure them differently. Any aggregate measure of materials inputs was so collinear with capital that it was 
eliminated—an implicit assumption is that they are in fixed proportion to capital.  
17 In contrast, the variable in Table 2 defined as CROPSIZ1 (defined as operated acreage of cropland) includes all 
land in the LAND variable, less land enrolled in CRP and less land in wild hay production. Our hypothesis is that 
while farm size (as measured by cropland) should affect participation in CRP and/or off-farm work, this measure of 
size should exclude land enrolled in CRP. 
18 To account for the complex stratified sample design, ERS has developed a delete-a-group jackknife procedure 
based on dividing the ARMS data into 15 nearly equal and mutually exclusive groups, with associated group (also 
called replicate) weights (Dubman 2000). While this procedure has proven reliable for estimating variances of many 
financial statistics (most are linear functions of the data) in large samples, much less is known about the 
performance in complex econometric models, particularly those involving relatively small subsamples of the ARMS 
data. As Goodwin and Mishra (2006) point out, it is not clear that the stratification scheme does not alter the 
likelihood functions beyond simple weights. They also argue that the appropriateness of applying the predefined 
jackknife replicate weights to several subsamples of the ARMS data, as in our case, is unclear. Since our focus is 
only on crop farms, the numbers of observations in the subsamples may well below the limits at which the 
“…jackknife estimator faces structural problems in its application” (Dubman 2000, p.11). This inability to correct 
for this sample design in estimating standard errors suggests that one must exercise more than a normal degree of 
caution in extending any statistical inferences to the general population. The full sample weights, however, are used 
in our analysis to reflect the appropriately the national characteristics of the crop farm households. 
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is equal to zero is 8.02, which is greater than the critical value (3.84) for the 5% significant level 
or higher. Therefore, we reject the hypothesis that these choices are independent.  
Determinants of CRP Participation 
Participation in CRP depends generally on some characteristics of the farm, the farm 
operator, land quality, and the circumstances in the local economy (Table 3). The probability of 
participation in CRP increases with farm size (CROPSIZ1), but is lower if the farm is primarily 
engaged in vegetable, fruit, and cotton, rather than other crop farms. This difference probably 
reflects the higher opportunity cost of removing land from production on vegetable or fruit farms.  
CRP participation is also determined by environmental characteristics. Perhaps it is no 
surprise to see that farm households located in areas where the maximum allowance of CRP 
rental payments are higher are more likely to participate in CRP, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, it 
appears that participation in CRP is more likely in counties with high indexes for both wind and 
water erosion.  
There are two variables that suggest participation in CRP is related to the life-cycle of the 
farm operator. The likelihood of CRP participation increases with age (OP_AGE). Thus, as 
farmers get older, committing some land to CRP may be one way of reducing operator labor 
requirements on the farm. This may also be a way of holding onto farmland assets until they are 
needed for the retirement years, or so that they can be passed on through an estate. The fact that 
there is a positive correlation between the probability of farmers working off the farm and the 
probability of participation in CRP (as measured by RHO) may also reflect a desire to reduce 
operator labor requirements as land is taken out of production. Finally, the likelihood of CRP 
participation increases as a farmer’s education (OP_ED_C) level increases; this is perhaps an 
indication that investments in human capital might lead to increases in CRP participation.  
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There are also several ways in which risk can affect the participation in CRP. As aversion 
to risk increases, the likelihood of participation in a program where payments are certain, such as 
CRP, should increase. This conclusion is supported by the negative sign on the variable “RISK” 
in Table 3 (e.g. high values for “RISK” are associated with farmers who prefer more risk). This 
result is also not inconsistent with Hennessey (1998) in that, with the decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA), farmers are likely to be less concerned about diversifying into risk-free 
income opportunities as wealth increases through decoupled payments.19 However, it is difficult 
to know if the attitudes toward risk are driving this result, or if it is also in part due to the fact 
that in order to receive decoupled payments, the land must be kept in good agricultural use 
(including fallow). Farmers would likely incur both fixed and variable costs to do so. 
Furthermore, by receiving decoupled payments rather than enrolling land in CRP, a farmer 
retains his program base acreage and the option of bringing land back into production or even 
converting it to non-agricultural uses. Finally, since commodity program related loan deficiency 
payments (LDP_A) reduce farm income variability, these payments also reduce risk averse 
farmers’ likelihood of allocating farm resources to CRP.       
Participation in other programs is also associated with the likelihood for CRP 
participation. For example, if the farmer is enrolled in a voluntary agricultural district, subject to 
a farmland preservation easement, or is located in an agricultural protection zone (the variable 
AGDIST), the farmer is less likely to participate in CRP. Many farmers participate in these types 
of programs (most of which are state or local programs) out of concern for maintaining their land 
in agricultural production in rapidly growing areas where there is competition for land for non-
agricultural purposes. Therefore, these farmers would be less likely to enroll land in a program 
                                                 
19 By assuming non-constant absolute risk aversion, Hennessey’s (1998) framework is also consistent with our 
results in the sense that he shows that under these conditions, decoupled payments can affect crop production 
alternatives.     
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such as CRP that essentially takes land out of production. The fact that the likelihood of CRP 
participation falls as the proportion of population that is urban rises would seem to reinforce this 
explanation, as would the fact that there is probably a higher option value for land in these areas 
that would be more difficult to realize on land that cannot be converted to a non-farm use for at 
least the duration of a CRP contract.20 In contrast, farmers who participate in the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)21 are also more likely to participate in CRP. Participation in 
both EQIP and CRP could reflect a farmer’s stewardship for the environment by removing 
particularly venerable land from production, while at the same time using more environmentally 
friendly practices on land still in production. 
Determinants of the Off-Farm Work Decision 
 As expected, the decision of the farm operator to engage in off-farm work also depends 
on characteristics of the farm, the farm operator, and the circumstances in the local economy 
(Table 3). As in much of the existing literature (e.g. Sumner 1982; Benjamin and Guyomard 
1994; Abdulai and Delgado 1999), our results continue to confirm the fact that older farmers are 
more likely to work off the farm. However, the effect is nonlinear. Although the operator’s 
education (OP_ED_C) has a positive effect on the probability of participation in off-farm labor 
market, the years of experience on the farm (OP_EXP) has a negative effect that increases at an 
increasing rate. Farm operators raised on farms (RAISE_OP) are also less likely to work off the 
farm. Since returns to off-farm labor are likely to be less variable than farm returns, the 
                                                 
20 Duke (2004) also found that the likelihood of participation in CRP is lower in urban areas. 
21 The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) is a voluntary conservation program for farmers and 
ranchers who promote agricultural production and environmental quality as compatible goals. It offers financial and 
technical help to assist eligible participants implement management practices on eligible agricultural land. Because 
EQIP was enacted in 1996, the rate of participation in EQIP reflected in the 2001 ARMS data is extremely modest 
(less than one percent, Table 2). Consequently, while the conclusion that those participating in EQIP are also more 
likely to participate in CRP has intuitive appeal, it is difficult to have much confidence in this empirical result. 
However, in a very different context, Goodwin and Smith (2003) offer additional evidence that participation in other 
farm programs can affect CRP participation. 
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indication that the likelihood of off-farm participation is lower for farm operators willing to 
accept more risk (a negative coefficient on “RISK” in Table 3, a variable that increases as a 
farmer is willing to accept more risk) is consistent with the theory of risk averse behavior, but the 
effect is not statistically significant.  
The likelihood of working off the farm decreases with family size (H_SIZE), but 
increases if the spouse is primarily a homemaker (SP_HMAK). This latter result may not square 
with the fact that the operator’s likelihood of working off the farm increases with the spouse 
working off the farm.22 The likelihood of participation in off-farm work declines with farm size 
(CROPSIZ1) and farm tenancy (TENANCY), and is lower for vegetable operations (VEGE) and 
cotton farms (COTTON). The negative effects on the likelihood of participation of both net 
worth (NETWORT1) and participation in government programs (e.g. AMTA_A) other than CRP 
may reflect wealth or scale effects on off-farm labor supply (Goodwin and Mishra 2004). The 
negative effect of tenancy (as measured by the proportion of acreage owned) on the likelihood 
for off-farm job participation reflects a greater commitment to agricultural production (ceteris 
paribus) from operators who own their own land. Finally, there is some indication that the 
strength of the local economy, as measured by the proportion of jobs that are manufacturing 
(MANUF), increases the likelihood of participation in off-farm work. The relative extent to 
which the local economy depends on jobs in the trade (TRADE) sectors reduces the likelihood to 
work off the farm.  
                                                 
22 To disentangle these results, we might well have to specify the characteristics of household size in greater detail 
and also deal with the fact that the decision of the spouse to work off the farm may be endogenous. It would be 
empirically challenging in estimating the distance functions needed for the efficiency analysis discussed below. 
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Technical Efficiencies of Farm Households 
The estimated multi-output distance functions are presented in Table 4. These functions 
fit the data quite well, and many of the coefficients are statistically significant. 23 For all models, 
the estimated input production elasticities are positive at the sample means but differ across 
groups.24 For example, the estimated production elasticities for land inputs are 0.45 and 0.13 for 
the group of farms participating in CRP and working off-farm, and for the group of farms 
participating in neither activity, respectively.  
The results of the Wald tests under the null hypothesis that the two terms included in the 
estimated distance functions to correct of self-selection bias are jointly equal to zero are all 
greater than the critical values for these four groups of farmers (the bottom of Table 4). These 
results indicate that household production and the participation in CRP and working off the farm 
are correlated due to some unobserved factors, and they support our corrections for the self-
selection bias.  
Comparing Distributions of Estimated Technical Efficiencies Among Groups 
Based on the estimates in Table 4, the composite error terms are then decomposed into 
their respective random error and technical inefficiency components according to equations (8) 
through (11), and estimates of the technical efficiencies for each farm household in the sample 
are calculated according to equation (12).  
To discuss the differences in technical efficiencies of household production across the 
four participant groups, it is important to emphasize, as we do in footnote 2, that these 
differences are affected directly by the terms accounting for self-section, but also indirectly 
                                                 
23 The standard errors of the estimators of these coefficients are based on the bootstrap method with 500 replications. 
24 Using the coefficients of the multi-output distance functions, we calculate these input production elasticities at the 
sample means of the data for each group. We then calculate the standard errors of these input elasticities based on 
the delta method. Thus, these standard errors can be regarded as the first-order approximations to the asymptotic 
standard errors of the input elasticities (Greene 2003).  
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through the distinct exogenous factors that explain participation in off-farm work and CRP and 
also characterize the environment in which farm and household production take place, although 
it is impossible to isolate these separate indirect effects. To discuss these differences in the 
technical efficiencies, we also report sample statistics in Table 5 and depict the cumulative 
distributions by group in Figure 1. To better understand the extent to which these distributions of 
technical efficiencies may differ by group, they are ranked by stochastic dominance criteria. 
Since it is well known that stochastic dominance criteria are not terribly robust in identifying 
differences in distributions (e.g. Pope and Ziemer 1984), we also test the null hypotheses that 
distributions of each pair of groups are the same by applying the test procedure developed by 
Davidson and Duclos (2000). The numbers in parentheses in Table 5 are the minimum values of 
the test statistics (distributed asymptotically normal) for tests under the null hypothesis.  
It is evident from Table 5 that, on average, the technical efficiency of household 
production is the highest for the subgroup participating in both off-farm work and CRP (e.g. 
subgroup (1,1)). Moreover, the distribution of farm household production for this subgroup 
statistically dominates other distributions either by first-degree or second-order stochastic 
dominance. These results provide important evidence in support of the hypothesis that since both 
the CRP and off-farm work remove substantial resources from agricultural production, doing so 
would improve the technical efficiency of the productive activities of the entire farm household. 
This is also true for those farms where the operator works off the farm, but where there is no land 
committed to CRP (e.g. subgroup (0,1)). In this case, the technical efficiency for the household is 
higher on average than that for farm production by those farmers participating in neither CRP 
nor off-farm work (0.72 vs. 0.43), and the former distribution also dominates the latter by first-
degree stochastic dominance (Table 5).  
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In contrast, for those farms where land is taken out of production and enrolled in the CRP, 
but the operator does not work off the farm, average household technical efficiency is 0.34. This 
suggests that while removing both land and labor from agricultural production improves the 
technical efficiency of farm household production, removing labor alone through off-farm work 
still improves resource allocation, but this is not true when only land is taken out of production 
through CRP participation.  
Finally, by examining the shape of these distributions of technical efficiency, we are also 
able to examine the effects on efficiency of off-farm work in somewhat greater detail than found 
in previous studies (e.g. Goodwin and Mishra 2004). The distribution of household efficiency of 
the farmers with off-farm work (te3_h) is dominated by the distribution of farm household 
participation in CRP and working of the farm (te1_h) at the second degree. Since the 
distributions cross, it is also important to compare those farms in the lower tails of the two 
distributions. In particular, the CDF for those with operators working off the farm lies to the left 
of those for the group that participating in both CRP and off-farm work. This evidence shows 
that the technical efficiency for the group (0,1) is lower than the technical efficiency of group 
(1,1) for a rather large proportion of the farm households. Thus, for the relatively inefficient 
farms, reallocating some labor to off-farm jobs and land in CRP seems to improve the efficiency 
for these farms. However, the story is different for farmers with relative higher technical 
efficiencies in that the CDF for those with operators only working off the farm lies to the right of 
those for the group that participating in both activities. It is in this part of the distribution that one 
might well have expected lower technical efficiencies for this group relative to the group 
involved in both activities, but it is not the case.  
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Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
To better understand the interaction between the farm business and the farm household, 
this paper focuses on several issues related to decisions by the farm household regarding 
participation in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and off-farm work. Our discussion is 
followed by the development of formal econometric specifications for the important components 
of the empirical analysis. By estimating these econometric models, we identify those factors that 
explain participation in these two major non-production related sources of income for farm 
households. For the appropriate subgroups of farm households, and accounting explicitly for the 
self-selection bias in estimating multi-output distance functions, we compare differences in 
technical efficiencies of the household production across subgroups of farms.  
Our findings support the hypothesis that decisions by the farm household to participate in 
CRP and to work off the farm are interrelated. Participation in CRP depends generally on farm 
characteristics, the farm operator (including age, experience, and attitudes to risk), environmental 
characteristics of the land, and the circumstances in the local economy. As one would expect, 
decisions to work off the farm are related to many of these same factors, although the direction 
and magnitude of some of the effects are quite different.  It is also true that both decisions are 
affected by participation in other farm programs. In particular, the probability of participation in 
CRP increases with farm size, but perhaps due to the higher opportunity cost of land removed 
from production, the probability of participation is less if the farm is primarily engaged in 
vegetable or fruit production.  
To shed additional light on the effects of these two decisions on the farm household 
production efficiency, we estimate multi-output distance functions for farm households engaged 
in CRP and/or off-farm work. Our results indicate that the operators’ decisions to work off the 
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farm (including those that also participate in CRP) have led to significant improvements 
technical efficiency, perhaps in part due to better allocation of resources. It is difficult to know 
why the reverse is true for those participating in CRP, but not working off the farm. One possible 
explanation is that the efficiency of household production is reduced by taking land out of 
production without making comparable reductions in labor used on the farm. Regardless of the 
reasons for these differences, the technical efficiency of the entire household is influenced by 
differential local and regional opportunities for off-farm work and to enroll land in CRP. These 
considerations could be increasingly important in future farm-level decisions, and in changes in 
the policy incentives to encourage participation in environmentally related programs such as the 
CRP. These considerations could be particularly important in certain areas of the country where 
the opportunity costs of enrolling land in CRP to promote environmental objectives have 
increased recently due to increased demand for corn and oil crops in the production of bio-fuels.  
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Table 1: Sample Distribution of Participants in 
CRP and Off-farm Work  
  CRP Program 
Off-farm Work 0  1 Total 
0 751  209 960 
% (34)   (10)  (44)  
1 950  280 1,230 
% (44)   (12)  (56) 
Total 1,701  489 2,190 
% (78)   (22)    
** Weighted with full sample weights. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Variable Definitions Mean Std. Dev.
Program Participation  
CRP If household enrolled in CRP or CREP (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.22 0.42 
OP If the operator worked off the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.56 0.50 
Characteristics of the Operator and Spouse 
OP_AGE Age of the operator 54.64 13.79 
OP_ED_C Education level of the operator (years) 13.03 2.44 
OP_EXP Years of the operator working on farm job 25.61 63.27 
RISK Risk preference of the operator; = 0 if risk averse, 10 if risk loving 4.47 2.42 
RAISE_OP If the operator was raised on the farm (= 1); otherwise (= 0) 0.79 0.41 
SP_HMAK If the spouse is a home maker (= 1); otherwise (= 0) 0.25 0.44 
H_SIZE Number of household members 2.74 1.27 
Farm Household Characteristics of the Farm 
CROPSIZ1 Operated acreage of cropland divided by 1,000 0.32 0.68 
TENANCY Owned acreage divided by total acreage   0.95 2.09 
GRAIN If cash grain farm (= 1), otherwise (=0)  0.42 0.49 
VEGE If vegetable farm (= 1), otherwise (= 0) 0.05 0.23 
FRUIT If fruit farm (=1), otherwise (= 0) 0.10 0.30 
COTTON If cotton farm (= 1), otherwise (= 0) 0.02 0.15 
AMTA_A Per acre AMTA (Agricultural Market Transition Act) payment  5.54 12.69 
LDP_A Per acre LDP (Loan Deficiency Payment) payment 8.34 18.24 
NETWORT1 Household net worth ($100,000) 4.60 15.72 
AGDIST If farm is in local agricultural preservation program (=1); otherwise (= 0) 0.05 0.22 
Environmental Characteristics 
MAXPAY Maximum CRP payment allowance (county level) 60.88 23.50 
WATER Index of water erosion (county level) 11.82 8.05 
WIND Index of wind erosion (county level) 2.65 3.59 
EQIP If participate in EQIP (=1), otherwise(= 0) 0.00 0.05 
Location and Local Economic Conditions 
URBAN Percent of labor market area's population in urban areas, (1990 census) 56.48 21.77 
MANUF LMA’s employment in manufacturing (%), lagged one year 13.97 6.87 
TRADE LMA’s employment in wholesale and retail trade (%), lagged one year 20.32 2.34 
REGN1 If ERS region 1(Heartland) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.29 0.45 
REGN3 If ERS region 3 (Northern Great Plains) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.07 0.26 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (cont.) 
Variable  Variable Definitions Mean Std. Dev.
REGN567 If ERS region 5 (E. Uplands) ,6 (S. Seaboard), 7 (Fruitful Rim) (=1) 0.29 0.46 
REGN9 If ERS region 9 (Mississippi Portal) (=1); otherwise (= 0) 0.05 0.22 
Production Performance 
OUTPUT Agricultural sales ($1,000) 58.39 209.92 
CRPOUT CRP Annual Payment ($1,000) 1.43 5.21 
OFFOUT Income from off-farm work ($1,000) 9.18 46.41 
HOUR_OFF Hours worked off the farm by operator and spouse 1,978 1,646 
ACRE_CRP Acres enrolled in CRP 38.11 161.99 
HOUR Hours worked on the farm by the operator and spouse 1,692 1,399 
LC_C Operating cost, including livestock, crop, and energy expenses 36,258 98,352 
LAND Operated acres 405 923 
CAPITAL Value of total non-current assets minus the operator dwelling ($1,000) 466 1598 
LABOR Hired labor cost 9,822 61,906 
* Note: all variables are weighted with full sampling weights. 
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Table 3:  Estimations of the Bivariate Probit Model 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
 CRP Decision 
Constant -2.02  -5.33  
OP_AGE 0.03  8.87  
OP_ED_C 0.05  3.28  
EQIP 0.93  1.91  
AGDIST -0.93  -3.12  
MAXPAY 0.01  3.56  
WIND 0.01  0.44  
WATER 0.02  2.14  
AMTA_A -0.02  -3.16  
LDP_A 0.00  -1.52  
RISK -0.04  -2.20  
CROPSIZ1 0.38  12.11  
REGN1 0.13  1.02  
REGN567 -0.89  -6.90  
REGN9 0.69  3.17  
URBAN -0.01  -7.62  
GRAIN -0.66  -6.47  
VEGE -1.96  -4.06  
FRUIT -1.81  -5.09  
COTTON -0.99  -3.83  
 Off-farm Work Decision 
Constant 0.72  0.64  
OP_AGE 0.10  4.08  
OP_AGESQ -1.51  -9.38  
OP_ED_C -0.05  -0.77  
OPAE 0.00  1.55  
OP_EXP -0.02  -4.25  
OP_EXPSQ 0.00  4.26  
H_SIZE -0.10  -3.34  
CROPSIZ1 -0.55  -16.12  
RAISE_OP -0.19  -1.99  
MANUF 0.02  3.48  
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Table 3: Estimations of the Bivariate Probit Model (cont.) 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
TRADE -0.04  -2.51  
AMTA_A -0.01  -2.85  
LDP_A 0.00  -2.16  
RISK -0.02  -1.46  
NETWORT1 -0.01  -1.88  
SP_HMAK 0.15  1.93  
REGN3 0.28  2.02  
REGN567 -0.23  -2.70  
TENANCY -0.04  -2.05  
GRAIN 0.17  1.85  
VEGE -1.47  -9.68  
FRUIT 0.02  0.15  
COTTON -0.60  -2.77  
RHO 0.15  2.96  
Log-likelihood -1,839  
LR test* 8.02  
Variables are defined in Table 2. 
RHO is the correlation coefficient. 
*The critical value is x2(0.95,1)=3.84 
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Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant 13.629 1.601 12.631 3.423 14.766 2.056 1.992 1.202
LGHOUR -0.346 -0.229 -1.569 -1.397 -3.835 -2.468 -1.277 -4.600
LGLAND 2.015 3.296 -1.184 -1.757 1.343 2.673 0.012 0.045
LGLABOR -0.701 -1.890 -0.218 -1.445 0.060 0.277 0.551 7.333
LGCA -5.270 -4.688 -0.729 -0.769 -0.827 -1.225 -0.297 -0.786
LGHOURSQ -0.121 -1.579 0.076 0.664 0.244 2.815 0.108 5.797
LGLANDSQ 0.018 0.417 0.070 1.086 -0.067 -4.936 0.029 2.842
LGLABORSQ 0.003 0.655 -0.023 -3.680 -0.025 -5.841 0.047 15.744
LGCASQ -0.073 -1.041 -0.044 -0.571 -0.013 -1.000 0.102 4.337
LGHOUR*LGLAND -0.326 -4.531 -0.096 -0.894 -0.142 -2.388 0.051 1.604
LGHOUR*LGLABR 0.080 2.036 0.003 0.081 0.013 0.506 -0.034 -3.646
LGHOUR*LGCA 0.672 4.580 0.203 1.648 0.105 1.253 0.028 0.623
LGLAND*LGLABR 0.000 0.018 0.089 3.649 0.000 -0.002 -0.037 -6.753
LGLAND*LGCA 0.008 0.088 -0.033 -0.339 -0.004 -0.195 -0.048 -2.313
LGLABOR*LGCA -0.020 -0.945 -0.036 -1.498 0.004 0.446 -0.065 -7.200
OUT21SQ 0.058 3.798 0.042 3.588 -- -- -- --
OUT31SQ -0.090 -4.106 -- -- -0.072 -10.193 -- --
OUT23 0.022 0.786 -- -- -- -- -- --
OUT2**LGHOUR 0.092 3.320 0.116 3.067 -- -- -- --
OUT2*LGLAND 0.017 0.341 -0.001 -0.014 -- -- -- --
OUT2*LGLABR 0.024 2.377 -0.003 -0.341 -- -- -- --
OUT2*LGCA -0.058 -1.075 -0.031 -0.541 -- -- -- --
OUT3*LGHOUR 0.063 1.812 -- -- 0.088 9.489 -- --
OUT3*LGLAND -0.002 -0.030 -- -- -0.101 -6.709 -- --
OUT3*LGLABR -0.050 -3.313 -- -- -0.005 -0.973 -- --
OUT3*LGCA -0.061 -1.131 -- -- 0.004 0.244 -- --
GRAIN 0.129 1.091 -0.305 -2.428 -0.089 -1.037 0.109 1.278
FRUIT 1.948 2.010 -0.278 -0.452 0.156 1.146 0.018 0.123
COTTON -0.107 -0.310 -0.997 -2.946 -0.208 -0.752 0.292 1.475
IMR_CRP 0.250 2.473 0.316 3.175 -0.121 -2.399 -0.241 -5.382
IMR_OP 0.199 1.964 0.081 0.947 0.188 1.753 -0.219 -4.881
Elasticities (at sample means)
Hour 0.189 1.754 0.091 0.517 0.069 0.610 0.662 7.793
Land 0.454 2.204 0.334 2.871 0.297 7.010 0.131 3.080
Labor 0.125 0.791 0.160 1.837 0.100 5.117 0.456 17.240
Capital 0.306 1.529 0.193 3.932 0.105 2.243 0.390 7.730
Adjusted R 2
Wald Test*
Table 4: Estimation of the Multiple Output Distance Functions
Group (1,1) Group (1,0) Group (0,1) Group (0,0)
0.95 0.93 0.83 0.82
* The null hypothesis is: IMR_CRP=IMR_OP are jointly equal to zero. Critical values x 2 (2,0.95)=5.99; x 2(2,0.90)=4.61
Group(1,1): both in CRP and off-farm work. Group(1,0): CRP only; Group(0,1): off-farm work only; Group (0,0): neither
Standard errors of the elasticities are derived on the delta method.
7.61 10.26 8.29 6.88
Note: Variables are defined in Table 1.
IMR_CRP and IMR_OP are calculated Inverse Mills Ratios for CRP and OP,  respectively. 
Standard errors of the estimators are based on the bootstrap method with 500 replications.
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Table 5: Sample Statistics for Household Technical Efficiencies 
Group (1,1) (1,0) (0,1) (0,0) 
Index TE1_H TE2_H TE3_H TE4_S 
 Sample Statistics 
Mean 0.72  0.34  0.72  0.43  
Std. Dev. 0.06  0.22  0.12  0.13  
25 percentile 0.70  0.15  0.67  0.35  
50 percentile 0.72  0.32  0.73  0.44  
75 percentile 0.75  0.53  0.80  0.51  
  Tests for Stochastic Dominance 
te1_h  FSD (6.65) SSD (2.30) FSD (7.49) 
te2_h     
te3_h  FSD (3.05)  FSD (3.05) 
te4_f    SSD (10.24)     
FSD and SSD represent first and second order stochastic dominance, respectively. 
The minimum value of the t-statistics over the sample is reported in parentheses.  
Statistics for the Stochastic Dominance tests follow Davidson and Duclos (2000). 
 
 34
 
Figure 1: Distributions of Household Technical Efficiencies  
 
 
TE1_H, TE2_H, TE3_H, and TE4_S are technical efficiencies of household models of groups 
(1,1), (1,0), (0,1), and (0,0) respectively.  
Group (1,1): For those farm households participating in CRP and working off-farm. 
Group (1,0): For those farm households participating in CRP only. 
Group (0,1): For those farm households working off- farm only. 
Group (0,0): For those farm households participating in neither programs. 
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